Guides · Online stores & checkout security

A critical alert went out for online stores. The real target is your checkout page.

Last Wednesday the Australian Signals Directorate's cyber centre issued a Critical alert about a flaw in Adobe Commerce and Magento that attackers were already using against shops. If you've never heard of Magento, it's tempting to stop reading there. Don't — the reason attackers want into an online store is almost always the same, whatever it's built on: the page where your customers type their card details. This guide explains what happened, who it actually applies to, and the checks worth doing this week.

What happened

On 7 September 2026 Adobe released an out-of-band fix (bulletin APSB26-146) for a flaw in Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2B and Magento Open Source — the software that runs a large number of mid-sized online shops. The flaw, CVE-2026-75650, nicknamed "StyleSmuggler" by the researchers who found it being used, is rated 10.0 on the CVSS scale. That is the maximum. It means an attacker who has never logged in, and who your store has never seen before, can make the store run code of their choosing.

Adobe has said the flaw was being exploited in the wild against merchants. Security firm Sansec traced exploitation back to 4 September — three days before a fix existed — and reported attackers installing web shells and a Linux backdoor on stores they got into. On 9 September 2026, ASD's ACSC published a Critical alert naming small and medium businesses in its audience, and said there is "a substantial number of potentially vulnerable instances within the Australian economy."

10.0
Severity rating
CVE-2026-75650 scored the maximum on the CVSS scale — no login needed, no customer action needed.
3 days
Attacks before the fix
Exploitation was observed from 4 September. Adobe's fix arrived on 7 September.
$56,600
Average cost per report
What a cybercrime report cost an Australian small business in 2024–25 — up 14% on $49,600 the year before (ASD).

Why this matters even if you don't run Magento

Magento is the store in the headline, but it isn't the story. The story is that attackers want checkout pages, and they will use whatever door is open on whatever platform you're running.

The technique has a name — web skimming, or Magecart. Instead of stealing a database, the attacker quietly adds a few lines of JavaScript to the page where customers type their card number. The page looks and works exactly as it did. The order goes through. The customer gets their confirmation email. And a copy of the card number, name, address and CVV goes to the attacker at the same time. Nothing visibly breaks, which is why these infections are often measured in weeks or months before anyone notices.

It isn't a Magento-only problem. Researchers at Confiant tracked one skimming operation that hit more than 40 storefronts across at least fifteen countries since around April 2026 — and found the compromised shops were overwhelmingly WooCommerce, with some PrestaShop, Magento and plain WordPress. In that campaign the loader was tucked inside a Google Tag Manager block so it read like ordinary analytics plumbing to anyone glancing at the page source.

A skimmer doesn't break your website. It works perfectly — that's the point of it.

Who this applies to

Any Australian business that takes payment, a booking deposit, or a card number through its own website. That includes online retailers, but also service businesses with a "pay your invoice here" page, clinics taking booking fees, and anyone running a shop plugin on an otherwise ordinary brochure site.

It applies much less if your checkout hands customers straight to a hosted payment provider — a Stripe, Square or PayPal page, or a payment field that provider supplies and controls — because then the card number never passes through code on your own server. That is a genuinely meaningful difference, and it's check five below.

Seven checks worth doing this week

01

Find out what your store actually runs on — and which version

What. Most owners inherited their store from a developer and have never been told what's under it. Why it matters. Every instruction below depends on the answer, and "I think it's WordPress?" isn't enough to act on. How. One email to whoever built or maintains the site: "What platform and version is our store running, when was it last updated, and who is responsible for updating it?" Write the answer down somewhere you'll find it next time.

02

If it's Adobe Commerce or Magento — apply the September fix, then have someone look for what was left behind

What. Adobe's hotfix for APSB26-146 covers Adobe Commerce 2.4.4 through 2.4.9, and Magento Open Source 2.4.6 through 2.4.9. Why it matters. Attackers had a three-day head start, so patching closes the door but does not prove nobody came through it first — the researchers were explicit about that. How. Ask your developer to apply the hotfix now if it isn't already done, and separately to check for unfamiliar admin accounts, files added to the store in early September, and any new code on the checkout page. If you find something, that's a job for a professional, not a DIY clean-up.

03

If it's WooCommerce — update WooCommerce itself, not just WordPress

What. A cross-site request forgery flaw in the WooCommerce plugin (CVE-2026-3589) affects versions 5.4.0 through 10.5.2 and was fixed in 10.5.3. In plain terms: if an attacker can get a logged-in shop admin to open a booby-trapped link, they can have the site create a new administrator account for them. Why it matters. A rogue admin account is how a skimmer gets planted in the first place. How. In WordPress, go to Plugins and check the WooCommerce version. If it's below 10.5.3, update it. Updating WordPress core does not update WooCommerce.

04

Delete the plugins you aren't using

What. Deactivated plugins still sit on the server and can still be exploited. Why it matters. Out-of-date components are the most common way a small-business site gets broken into, and the ones nobody uses are the ones nobody updates. How. Open your plugin list. Anything you can't explain the purpose of, and anything deactivated for more than a few months, should be deleted rather than left in place. Take a backup first.

05

Make sure card numbers never touch your own server

What. There's a real difference between a checkout that collects card details in your own form and sends them on, and one that uses a hosted payment page or a payment field supplied by Stripe, Square, PayPal or your bank. Why it matters. If the card number is only ever typed into the provider's own field, a skimmer sitting in your page has far less to steal — and your PCI obligations are much lighter. How. Ask your developer or payment provider one question: "Does the card number ever pass through our website's own code?" If the answer is yes, ask what it would take to move to their hosted fields. Most providers offer this and want you to use it.

06

Look at what else loads on your checkout page

What. Checkout pages accumulate third-party scripts over the years — chat widgets, analytics, ad pixels, review tools, abandoned-cart tools. Each one is code from someone else running on the page where your customers type their card details. Why it matters. If any of those providers is compromised, their code — now malicious — runs on your checkout, and it will not appear anywhere in your own files. How. Ask for a list of every script that loads on the checkout page specifically, and remove the ones the business no longer uses. Marketing tags added for a campaign three years ago are the usual culprits.

07

Decide now what you'd do if it happened

What. A ten-minute conversation, written down: who you call, who can take the store offline, where the backups are, and how far back they go. Why it matters. The expensive part of a skimming incident is rarely the technical clean-up — it's the days lost working out who's responsible while the skimmer keeps running. How. Write the names and numbers on one page. If customer data was exposed, whether you have to notify anyone under the Privacy Act depends on your turnover and your industry, and that's genuinely a judgement call — worth having a professional review it rather than guessing. ASD's ACSC also takes reports on 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371).

The part people skip: the patch isn't the whole job

This week's alert is the second serious Adobe Commerce flaw in under a year. The earlier one — "SessionReaper", CVE-2025-54236, rated 9.1 — has been exploited since late 2025, and Sansec's own telemetry suggested roughly three in five stores still hadn't applied that fix weeks after it shipped. That's the number worth sitting with. The vulnerabilities get the headlines; the gap between a fix existing and a fix being applied is what actually gets stores robbed.

If you take one thing from this guide, make it check one. Knowing what your store runs on, and who is responsible for updating it, is what turns the next alert from a fortnight of uncertainty into a ten-minute job.

What a scan can and can't see

We check what is publicly visible from outside a website. On an online store that includes whether your checkout hands off to a recognised hosted payment provider, whether WordPress core, plugins and themes match known vulnerability records, and — on our Expert tier — third-party scripts loading on your pages without integrity checks, which is the surface a skimmer exploits.

What we cannot do is tell you that nothing has already been planted. We don't log in, we don't read your database, and we don't attempt to break in — so a skimmer hidden in server-side code, or behind your admin login, is outside what an external review can see. If you have reason to think a store has already been compromised, what you need is a forensic examination by someone with access to the server, not a scan. We'd rather say that plainly than let a clean report be mistaken for an all-clear.

Sources

Know what you're running

See what your checkout page is actually loading.

The free Scorecard runs the same 36 checks as Essentials — including payment handling and known software vulnerabilities — and tells you how many issues it found and how serious they are. No payment details, no sales call.